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1. Abstract
We show that a number of cryptographic protocols using non-commutative
semigroups including the Cha-Ko-Lee-Han-Cheon braid group cryptosystem
have security based on the MSCSP. We give two algorithms to solve the DP
using the MSCSP.
2. Introduction
At the CRYPTO 2000 conference the seminal KLCHKP (Ko-Lee-Cheon-
Han-Kang-Park) braid group public-key cryptosystem was published see [2].
An updated version of the KLCHKP cryptosystem which is the CKLHC (Cha-
Ko-Lee-Han-Cheon) braid group cryptosystem was introduced at ASIACRYPT
2001 conference [10] the claim of the authors was the updated cryptosystem is
based on the DH-DP (Diffie-Hellman Decomposition Problem). We show that
the KLCHKP and CKLHC cryptosystems are based on the MSCSP and it has
been assumed for several years the security of these cryptosystems are based on
the DH-CP and DH-DP respectively, we also show the related cryptosystems
may be based on the MSCSP and hence give a new way to break the KLCHKP
and CKLHC cryptosystems and the related cryptosystems for some parameters.
It has been shown there is a linear algebraic attack on the KLCHKP and CKLHC
cryptosystems but our attack is more practical.
3. Hard Problems in Non-Abelian Groups
Definition-The MSCSP (multiple simultaneous conjugacy search problem)
[3] is find elements g ∈ G such that yi = gxig
−1, given the publicly known
information: G is a group, xi, yi ∈ G with xi, yi = axia
−1, 1 ≤ i ≤ u, with the
secret element a ∈ G.
Definition-The CSP [3] can be defined as the MSCSP with u = 1.
Notation-We refer an example of the MSCSP as ((x1, x2, ..., xu), (y1, y2, ..., yu))
with solution g.
The DP (Decomposition Problem) [6] is defined as follows.
Public Information: G is a semigroup, A is a subset of G. x, y ∈ G with y = axb.
Secret information: a, b ∈ A.
Objective: find elements f, g ∈ A such that fxg = y.
The definition of theDP above generalises the definition of a less general version
of the DP given in [8], [3] and [7]. The less general version only differs from
the above definition of DP because G is a group and A is a subgroup. In
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our notation in all of this paper we omit the binary operation ∗ when writing
products so for example f ∗ x ∗ g is understood to mean fxg. We require that
∗ is efficiently computable.
The CSP (Conjugacy Search Problem) [1], [3] is defined as follows.
Public Information: G is a group. x, y ∈ G with y = f−1xf .
Secret Information: f ∈ G.
Objective: find an element g ∈ G such that g−1xg = y.
Notation-We refer an example of the CSP as (x, y) with solution g.
The DH-DP (Diffie-Hellman Decomposition Problem) [8], [3] is defined as
follows.
Public Information: G is a group. A,B are subgroups of G with [A,B] = 1.
x, ya, yb ∈ G with ya = axb, yb = cxd.
Secret Information: a, b ∈ A, c, d ∈ B.
Objective: find the element cyad(= aybb = acxbd).
The DH-CP (Diffie-Hellman Conjugacy Problem) is the specialisation of the
DH-DP [8] with a = b−1 and c = d−1.
We now re-define the DP and DH-DP above as used in our key agreement
protocol given in [12]. In the rest of this paper below the DP and DH-DP will
mean their re-definitions.
The re-definition of the DP is as follows.
Public Information: G is a semigroup. A, B are subsets of G. x, y ∈ G with
y = axb.
Secret Information: a ∈ A, b ∈ B.
Objective: find elements f ∈ A, g ∈ B such that fxg = y.
The re-definition of the DH-DP is as follows.
Public information: G is a semigroup. A,B,C,D are subsets of G. x, ya, yb ∈ G
with ya = axb, yb = cxd.
Secret Information: a ∈ A, b ∈ B, c ∈ C, d ∈ D.[A,C] = 1, [B,D] = 1
Objective: find the element cyad (= aybb = acxbd).
The EDL problem is to decide if the discrete logarithm of two elements in
an abelian group are the same [9]. The EDL type problem is as follows [9].
Public information: G is a group. a, b, ya, yb ∈ G with ya = uav, yb = wbx.
Secret Information: u, v, w, x ∈ G.
Objective: Decide if Fa(ya) ∩ Fb(yb) 6= ∅. Where Fβ(α) = {(a, b) ∈ Bn × Bn
:α = aβb}.
We redefine the EDL problem more generally as follows.
Public information: G is a Semigroup. A,B,C,D are subsets ofG. a, b, ya, yb ∈
G with ya = uav, yb = wbx.
Secret Information: u ∈ A, v ∈ B, w ∈ C, x ∈ D.
Objective: Decide if Fa(ya) ∩ Fb(yb) 6= ∅. Where Fβ(α) = {(a, b) ∈ Bn × Bn
:α = aβb}.
4. Key Agreement Protocol Using Non-Commutative Semigroups
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In [12] we introduced a key agreement protocol and a variant of it which we
briefly describe below.
• Phase 0. Initial setup
i) G is chosen and is publicly known.
A first method to select the parameters is to select publicly known subsets
or privately known subsets LA, LB, RA, RB and Z of G are chosen for
which either property a) below is true or property b) below is true. Let
z ∈ Z with z the publicly known element which is the value of x in the
definition of the DH-DP used in the example of the DH-DP in our new
authentication scheme.
Following [7] let g ∈ G for G a group, CG(g) is the centraliser of g, we
sketch the modifications to the authentication scheme (and these apply to
the key agreement protocol described below) to give two further methods
to select the subgroups as follows. Publicly known subsets or privately
known LA, LB, RA, RB and Z of G are chosen for which either property
a) below is true or property b) below for the second and third methods
below.
The second method to select the subgroups is A chooses (a1, a2) ∈ G×G and
publishes the subgroups as a set of generators of the centralisers LB, RB, LB ⊆
CG(a1), RB ⊆ CG(a2), LB = {α1, ..., αk} etc. B chooses (b1, b2) ∈ LB × RB,
and hence can compute x below etc. Following [7] there is no explicit indication
of where to select a1 and/or a2 from. Hence before attempting a length based
attack in this case the attacker has to compute the centraliser of LB, RB.
So a third method to select the subgroups is
A chooses LA = G, a1 ∈ G, and publishes LB ⊆ CG(a1), LB = {α1, ..., αk},
B chooses LB = G, b2 ∈ G, and publishes RA ⊆ CG(b2), RA = {β1, ..., βk},
Hence A chooses (a1, a2) ∈ G × CG(b2) and publishes the subgroup(s) as a
set of generators of the centralisers B chooses (b1, b2) ∈ CG(a1)×G, and hence
can compute x etc. Again there is no explicit indication of where to select a1
and/or b2 from. Hence before attempting a length based attack in this case the
attacker has to compute the centraliser of LB and/or RB .
a) If z 6= e we require the following conditions
[LA, LB] = 1, [RA, RB] = 1,
[LB, Z] 6= 1, [LA, Z] 6= 1,
[RB, Z] 6= 1, [RA, Z] 6= 1,
[LA, RA] 6= 1, [LB, RB] 6= 1.
(2)
All the above conditions for z 6= e can arise by generalising from properties of
subgroups used in the SDG or CKLHC schemes for example the second and
third conditions in (2) arise from the observations that in general [LBn, Bn] 6=
1, [LBn, UBn] = 1.
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b) If z = e we require the following conditions
[LA, LB] = 1, [RA, RB] = 1,
[LA, RA] 6= 1, [LB, RB] 6= 1,
[LB, RA] 6= 1, [LA, RB] 6= 1.
(3)
.
• Choose z ∈ Bn.
ii) A(lice) chooses a secret braid a1 ∈ LA, a2 ∈ RA, her private key; she
publishes KA = a1za2; the pair (w,KA) is the public key.
i) B(ob) chooses a secret braid b1 ∈ LB, b2 ∈ RB, her private key; she
publishes KB = b1zb2; the pair (w,KB) is the public key.
iii) A and B can compute the common shared secret key κ as κ = a1KBa2
and κ = b1KAb2 respectively.
i) Choose a public w
h is a fixed collision-free hash function from braids to sequences of 0’s and
1’s or, possibly, to braids, for which this choice for h. Again the above protocol
is considered with the commutativity conditions 2 or 3. Note the braids KA
and KB are rewritten for example a normal form to make the protocol secure.
Full detail are given in [12]. It was shown in [12] that the above key agreement
protocol is a generalisation of the key protocols given in [10],[2],[6],[7].
5. The Diffie-Hellman Decomposition Problem is Equivalent to the
Multiple Simultaneous Conjugacy Search Problem
In this section we will show that the DH-DP is equivalent to the MSCSP
in our key agreement protocol in section 2.1 hence showing the key exchange
protocols given in [10],[2],[11] are based on the MSCSP and the key exchange
protocols in [6],[7] may be based on the MSCSP. In the braid group there are
various algorithms MSCSP can be solved with non-negligible probability such
as length based algorithms or the algorithm using ultra summit sets given in [4]
so for braid group implementations the algorithms we show are based on the
MSCSP should not be used. Our result also applies to the variant key exchange
protocol and variant authentication scheme given in [12].
We now introduce the concept of a CE (conjugacy extractor) function which
we build our attack upon.
Notation-We define a CE (conjugacy extractor) function to be a function
that on input of information from an user and information transmitted in a
cryptographic protocol gives as its output a conjugacy equation, by conjugacy
equation we mean an instantiation of the CSP. We denote i CE functions as
CEi, or CE if there is just one function involved.
Theorem 1
Solving the DH-DP is equivalent solving the MSCSP assuming ya and/or yb
are invertible elements in the DH-DP.
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Proof
The proof is for when considering commutativity conditions 2 or 3 in the
generalised protocol above, when condition 3 are used then x = e. Firstly define
the CE for a protocol based on the DH-DP as follows
CE1(RI , ya) = yaRIy
−1
a = axbRIb
−1x−1a−1 = axRIx
−1a−1, RI ∈ D
CE2(SI , yb) = ybSIy
−1
b = cxdSId
−1x−1c−1 = cxSIx
−1c−1, SI ∈ B
CE3(R
′
I , ya) = y
−1
a R
′
Iya = b
−1x−1a−1R′Iaxb = b
−1x−1R′Ixb,R
′
I ∈ C
CE4(S
′
I , yb) = y
−1
b S
′
Iyb = d
−1x−1c−1S′Icxd = d
−1x−1S′Ixd, S
′
I ∈ A
RI is chosen from the subset that commutes with the subset that the secret
a in ya is chosen from. SI is chosen from the subset that commutes with the
subset that the secret b in yb is chosen from etc. Since all the parameters are
known to compute the CE1,...,CE4 are easily computable. Note it is sufficient
for one CE to exist to prove the theorem but we may want to compute more
than one CE because their difficulty may vary, for example one of the CE of the
protocols [7] can be used in a known length attack. Obviously RI (in general)
does not commute with x (similarly RI in general does not commute with a
when conditions 3 are used) as this would mean an attacker could easily recover
the common secret key. So for 1 ≤ I ≤ u this shows that the key agreement
protocol in [2] is based on the MSCSP for the secret in either ax or the MSCSP
in the secret cx. So a or c can be found by right multiplying by x−1 which
is publicly known. Hence the protocols in [10], [2],[6],[7],[11] are based on an
example of the MSCSP as
((R1, R2, ..., Ru), (CE1(R1, ya), CE1(R2, ya), ..., CE1(Ru, ya)))with solution ax.
((S1, S2, ..., Su), (CE2(S1, yb), CE2(S2, yb), ..., CE2(Su, yb)))with solution cx.
((R′1, R
′
2, ..., R
′
u), (CE1(R
′
1, ya), CE1(R
′
2, ya), ..., CE1(R
′
u, ya)))with solution b
−1x−1.
((S′1, S
′
2, ..., S
′
u), (CE2(S
′
1, yb), CE2(S
′
2, yb), ..., CE2(S
′
u, yb)))with solution d
−1x−1.
We now give applications of our theorem for the protocols [10], [2],[6],[7],[11]
there are algorithm that solve the MSCSP with non-negligible probability such
as a length attack [5], so a length attack may be used for the protocol [10],[2],[6],
[7]. Following the notation in [7] , where G is a group so the security of the
protocol in [7] is always based on the MSCSP (because we know the generators
for the elements a2 and b1 we can use a length attack so disproving the claim
in [7] ), we have
CE1(AI , PA) = P
−1
A AIPA = a
−1
2
w−1a−1
1
AIa1wa2 = a2w
−1AIwa2,
AI ∈ A , A is a subgroup of CG(a1)
CE2(BI , PB) = PBBIP
−1
B = b1wb2BIb
−1
2
w−1b−1
1
= b1wBIw
−1b−1
1
,
RI ∈ B, B is a subgroup of CG(b2)
if it may be easy for a some sets {g1, g2, ..., gk} of the elements of G to compute
a part of or all (if G is the braid group there are algorithms that will compute
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a large part of the centraliser)
C(g1, ..., gk) = C(g1) ∩ ...C(gk)
then we can compute the following
CE3(CI , PA) = PACIP
−1
A = a1wa2CIa
−1
2
w−1a−1
1
= a1wAIw
−1a−1
1
,
CI ∈ C,C a subgroup of CG(b2)
CE4(DI , PB) = P
−1
B DIPB = b
−1
2
w−1b−1
1
DIb1wb2 = b
−1
2
w−1BIwb2,
RI ∈ D,D a subgroup of CG(a1)
Following the notation in [6] let the elements transmitted by Alice and Bob be
invertible then
CE1(EI) = b
−1
1
w−1a−1
1
EIa1wb1 = b1w
−1EIwb1, EI ∈ B
CE2(FI) = b2wa2FIa
−1
2
w−1b−1
2
= b1wFIw
−1b−1
1
, BI ∈ A
and so we can use this equation in a length attack. It may be asked how much
better is a length attack using the conjugacy equations above for [7],[6] (and
related protocols) compared to the known length attacks on [7],[6], and if the
above equations can be used to improve the known length attacks (for example
we may try using one and/or both equations above they can be used to decide
peeling off the correct generator in combination with the algorithm that decides
to peel of generators in an existing attack, an example would be if the above
existing algorithm is unable (i.e. pick at random) to decide which is the correct
generator to peel then peeling from CE1 and /or CE2 may be used to decide
the correct generator). Following the notation in [11] we have
CE1(GI , c) = cGIc
−1 = arbsGIb
−sa−r = arbαa−r, GI = b
α, for some α chosen by attacker
or using the suggestion of using the element e in [11] we have
CE2(HI , c) = cGIc
−1 = arebsHIb
−se−1a−r = ar(ebαe−1)a−r, HI = b
α,
for some α chosen by attacker.
Following the notation in [2] we have
CE1(KI , y1) = y1KIy
−1
1
= axa−1KIax
−1a−1 = axKIx
−1a−1,KI ∈ RBr
CE2(LI , y2) = y2LIy
−1
2
= bxb−1LIbx
−1b−1 = bxLIx
−1b−1, LI ∈ LBl
CE3(MI , y1) = y
−1
1
MIy1 = ax
−1a−1MIaxa
−1 = ax−1MIxa
−1,KI ∈ RBr
CE4(NI , y2) = y
−1
2
LIy2 = bx
−1b−1NIbxb
−1 = bx−1NIxb
−1, LI ∈ LBl
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Following the notation in [13] we have
CE1(TI , wi) = wiTIw
−1
i = yi−1viy
−1
i KIyiv
−1
i y
−1
i−1 = yi−1viKIv
−1
i y
−1
i−1
CE1(TI , w
−1
i ) = w
−1
i TIwi = yiv
−1
i y
−1
i−1KIyi−1viy
−1
i = yiv
−1
i KIviy
−1
i
KI is chosen from the subgroup that generates the elements xj
UI is chosen from the subgroup that generates the elements yJ
So the secrets y1, ..., yk can be recovered and hence vi = y
−1
i−1wiyi
CE2(UI , w) = wUIw
−1 = x0v1x1v2...vkxkUIx
−1
k v
−1
k ...v
−1
2
x−1
1
v−1
1
x−1
0
= x0v1x1v2...vkUIv
−1
k ...v
−1
2
x−1
1
v−1
1
x−1
0
recovering x0v1x1v2...vk gives xk = (x0v1x1v2...vk)
−1w similarly
CE2(UI , w
−1) = w−1UIw gives x0. Because all vi can be recovered
so similarly repeating the attack above using
CE2(UI , (x0v1)
−1wx−1k v
−1
k ) for x1,xk−1 and similarly by repeating
again all the xi can be recovered.
Following the notation in [10] we have
CE1(PI , c1) = c1PIc
−1
1
= a1xa2PIa
−1
2
x−1a−1
1
= a1xPIx
−1a−1
2
, PI ∈ UBr
CE1(QI , y1) = c2QIc
−1
2
= b1xb2QIb
−1
2
x−1b−1
1
= b1xQIx
−1b−1
1
,KI ∈ LBr
The CKLHC protocol in [10] was introduced as an improvement of the KLCHKP
protocol which it is a generalisation/modification of but we have shown the
CKLHC does not improve the security of the KLCHKP protocol as they are both
based on the MSCSP. This means using the KLCHKP and CKLHC cryptosys-
tems is no more secure than using the AAG (Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld) scheme
[1] in the connection that they can all be broken using by solving the MSCSP.
Hence this means there is no need to use the CKLHC cryptosystem any longer.
The theorem implies the Turing reduction of the DH-DP to the MSCSP (MSCSP
∝T DH-DP) for the case when the above DH-DP have related solutions, clearly
a conjugacy extractor can be feasibly computed- that is in polynomial time and
polynomial space (for parameters used in the CKLHC cryptosystem) using a
finite number of group operations. If the conjugacy extractor is not computable
in polynomial time and polynomial space in the connection of breaking a cryp-
tographic protocol then the above protocol may be secure from an attack by
solving the MSCSP, we may consider a generalisation of the MSCSP in the
above cryptographic protocol where G is a semigroup instead of a group. Note
if we have one CE then we exactly have the Turing reduction of the DP to the
MSCSP (MSCSP ∝TDP) , and hence the Turing reduction of the DH-DP to
the MSCSP (MSCSP ∝T DH-DP).
In [14] an authentication scheme is given based on the problem of shifted
conjugacy search problem (SCSP). It is not stated in [14] not to select r (the
random value used in the commitment x = r ∗ p = r · dp · σ1 · dr
−1) from a
publicly known subgroup. Then an attack is as follows.
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1. Suppose r ∈ R where R = {α1, ..., αk} is a publicly known subgroup of
Bn. In this step it is required the attacker just needs to find one element that
commutes with r and not al least with dp · σ1 (using a chosen algorithm by the
attacker) to show that SCSP can be reduced to solving the CSP. The attacker
picks a subgroup of R given by the generators g1, ..., gk. Then the attacker
computes all of or a large part of
N = C(α1, ..., αk) = C(α1) ∩ ...C(αk).
2. Then
CE1(NI , r ∗ p) = (r · dp · σ1 · dr
−1)−1NI(r · dp · σ1 · dr
−1) =
dr · σ−1
1
· dp−1 · r−1 ·NI · (r · dp · σ1 · dr
−1) = dr · σ−1
1
· dp−1NIdp · σ1 · dr
−1
will be true. NI ∈ N , 1 ≤ I ≤M . The the protocol can be based on the MSCSP
with
((N1, N2, ..., NM ), (CE(N1, r ∗ p), CE(N2, r ∗ p), ..., CE(NM , r ∗ p)))
with solution (dr · σ−1
1
· dp−1, dp · σ1 · dr
−1), O = dp · σ1 · dr
−1.
and r can be found by computing (σ−1
1
· dp−1O)−1 = r, there is a similar attack
if s (Alice’s private key) is chosen from a subgroup that is publicly known. Note
the similar attack with NI commuting r · dp would mean the SCSP is just the
CSP (no extra computation using d is required).
As a variant of the above algorithm an attacker may try to compute an
element N
′
I ∈ C(L) then it may be possible to use N
′
I instead of NI in the
attack above where L = r ∗ p or L = r ∗ p
′
, so in this variant knowledge of s
(L = p
′
here) or r being chosen from a subgroup is not required. A different
second CE on the authentication scheme in [14] or the SCSP, is suppose in a
general case we have a pair of examples of the SCSP that have the same secret
element x = r ∗ p, x
′
= r ∗ p
′
(the notation here follows [14] with the secret
element r) then
CE2(x, x
′
−1) =
CE2(r ∗ p, r ∗ p
′
) = x · x
′
−1
= (r · dp · σ1 · dr
−1) · (r · dp
′
· σ1 · dr
−1)−1
= (r · dp · σ1 · dr
−1) · dr · σ−1
1
· dp
′
−1 · r−1
= r · dp · dp
′
−1 · r−1
so the secret r can be found by solving the CSP pair (dp ·dp
′
−1, CE(r∗p, r∗p
′
))
for r, there is a similar CE for dr (use x−1 · x
′
instead of x · x
′
−1 and then dr is
transformed to r etc). Then the attack waits until b = 1 is so in this case Alice
send to Bob r ∗ s = r · ds · σ1 · dr
−1 hence the attacker computes the private
key s = r−1 · (r ∗ s) · dr · σ−1
1
. We note the above attacks is can be used to
answer question 2.6 in [14] (with y = p in th CSP). We note our attack can be
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used to solve the shifted conjugacy decision problem. Our results suggest that
CE functions should be hard to compute hence semigroups may be considered
because then the theorem 1 may be false because the elements ya and/or yb
are not invertible. This suggestion applies to any hard problem such as the
EDL problem below. Note in the algorithms in CE computations it may be
centraliser element(s) (call these pi) that multiply the secret(s) cancel out and
it can be shown these factors in the centraliser are efficiently computable, for
example one way to do this is if pi is a power of the fundamental braid then we
can estimate a power of the fundamental braid from the public elements (for
example using a length function) and so recover a pi, or instead find this power
by brute force.
We now consider a problem related to the SCSP/CSP which is given a
semigroup G, and publicly known functions u : G → G1, v : G2 → G,w :
G3 → G, G1, G2, G3 are subsets of G, and publicly the publicly known ele-
ments yi = u(r)v(pi)w(r
−1), v(pi), 1 ≤ i ≤ n find if the element r. We ob-
serve that the problem generalises the twisted conjugacy problem [15] and the
doubly twisted conjugacy problem [15], e.g. with i = 1, u an endomorphism,
v, w the identity map we recover the twisted conjugacy problem, G a group,
G1 = G,G2 = G,G3 = G; so we refer to the above problem as the GTCP (gen-
eralised twisted conjugacy problem) which we now describe solutions for. Now
consider the GTCP with i > 1, select a pair i, j with v(pi) 6= v(pj),1 ≤ i, j ≤ n
we have the conjugacy extractor
CE1(yi, yj) = yi · y
−1
j
CE1(u(r)v(pi)w(r
−1), u(r)v(pj)w(r
−1)) = u(r)v(pi)w(r
−1) · (u(r)v(pj)w(r
−1))−1
= u(r)v(pi)w(r
−1) · w(r−1)−1v(pj)
−1u(r)−1
= u(r)v(pi)v(pj)
−1u(r)−1
so here we solve the CSP pair (v(pi)v(pj)
−1,CE1(yi, yj)). Once u(r) is obtained
(attempt to) use the inverse of u to get r.
CE2(yi, yj) = y
−1
j · yi
CE2(u(r)v(pi)w(r
−1), u(r)v(pj)w(r
−1)) = (u(r)v(pj)w(r
−1))−1 · u(r)v(pi)w(r
−1)
= w(r−1)−1v(pj)
−1u(r)−1 · u(r)v(pi)w(r
−1)
= w(r−1)−1v(pj)
−1v(pi)w(r
−1)
so here we solve the CSP pair (v(pj)
−1v(pi),CE2(yi, yj)). Once w(r) is obtained
use the inverse of w to get r. Note for one of the above CE functions for the
twisted conjugacy problem the problem is just the conjugacy search problem.
The above can be repeated for different i, j to get a reduction to the MSCSP.
Another method to solve the GTCP as follows.
1. Suppose G1 = {α1, ..., αk}, G3 = {β1, ..., βl} are publicly known. In this
step it is required that one element that commutes with r is to be found. Pick
subgroups of G1, G3 given by the generators g1, ..., gL, h1, ..., hL. Then compute
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all of or a large part of
N = C(α1, ..., αk) = C(α1) ∩ ...C(αk).
M = C(β1, ..., βk) = C(β1) ∩ ...C(βl).
2. Then
CE3(MI , yi) = u(r)v(pi)w(r
−1)MI(u(r)v(pi)w(r
−1))−1 =
u(r)v(pi)w(r
−1)MIw(r
−1)−1v(pi)
−1u(r)−1 =
u(r)v(pi)MIv(pi)
−1u(r)−1
and
CE4(NI , yi) = (u(r)v(pi)w(r
−1))−1NJu(r)v(pi)w(r
−1) =
w(r−1)−1v(pj)
−1NJv(pi)w(r
−1))
NJ ∈ N,MI ∈M, 1 ≤ I ≤ m, 1 ≤ J ≤ n. Hence using CE3(MI , yi), CE4(NI , yi):
the GTCP has a solution respectively in the MSCSPs with
((N1, N2, ..., Nn), (CE4(N1, yj1), CE4(N2, yj2), ..., CE4(Nn, yjn)))
with solution w(r−1)−1v(pj)
−1;
((M1,M2, ...,Mm), (CE3(M1, yi1), CE3(M3, yi2), ..., CE3(Mm, yim)))
with solution u(r)v(pi);
; from w(r−1)−1v(pj)
−1, u(r)v(pi) we can obtain r by using a right multipli-
cation and using the inverses of w, u; this show the twisted conjugacy problem
can be deterministically reduced to the MSCSP. We observe the algorithm in
section 7 below can be used to attempt to solve the twisted or doubly twisted
conjugacy problem with or without using u or v. Observe once we have found a
solutions to the twisted conjugacy problem, SCSP this means we can solve the
decision version of the twisted conjugacy problem and SCSP.
6. A Solution for the EDL type problem in Non-commutative Semigroups.
The EDL braid type problem was proposed in [9] where it is assumed to be
hard. Following the notation in our definition above of the EDL we have the
following theorem.
Theorem 2
Given (the DP equations) ya = uav, yb = wbx in the EDL is sometimes
equivalent to solving the CSP if ya,yb are both invertible elements.
Proof
We will solve this problem by solving a system of DP equations for certain
values of the secrets so our proof can be used to solve a system of DP equations
for example in showing above the shifted conjugacy based protocol is based on
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the CSP. Assume w = u and x = v,a 6= b, then ya = uav, yb = ubv, and so the
CE functions give
yay
−1
b = uab
−1u−1
y−1a yb = v
−1a−1bv
and so we can solve the CSP pairs for (ab−1, yay
−1
b ), and (a
−1b, y−1a yb) for g1 = u
and g2 = v respectively using an algorithm for the CSP. The the verification
(can be done efficiently using the algorithms for the word problem when G is
the braid group e.g. see [10]) ya = g1ag2, yb = g1bg2 will be true by the above
assumption, hence we have shown the EDL to be true in this case. For some
examples of the CSP there are fast algorithm for it for example see [4] hence
the assumption in [9] that the EDL is hard is not always true. If we know the
generators of the subgroups A and B then we may use a length based algorithm
to recover the secret element with non-negligible probability.
We re-define again the EDL problem more generally as follows
Public information: G is a Semigroup.A,B,C,D are subsets ofG. ai, bi, xi, yi ∈
G with yi = aixibi, 1 ≤ i ≤ m
Secret Information: ai ∈ Ai, bi ∈ Bi, (Ai and Bi are subgroups).
Objective: Decide if Fx1(y1)∩Fx2(y2)...∩Fxr (yr ) 6= ∅.. Where Fβ(α) = {(a, b) ∈
Bn ×Bn :α = aβb}.
Theorem 3
Given the generalised EDL above is sometimes equivalent to solving the CSP.
The generalised EDL may be partially solved in the connection a subset integers
t1, t2, ..., tr in [1,m] we can decide if Fxt1 (yt1 ) ∩ Fxt2 (yt2 )... ∩ Fxtr (ytr ) 6= ∅.
Proof
Again we will solve this problem by solving the a system of DP equations
for certain values of the secrets so our proof can be used to solve a system of
DP equations. Assume ai = aj and bi = bj for all i, j ∈ [1,m] and i 6= j then
yi = aixibi, yj = ajxjbj , and so the CE functions give
yiy
−1
j = aixix
−1
j a
−1
i
y−1i yj = b
−1
i x
−1
i xjbi
and so we can solve the CSP pairs (xix
−1
j , yiy
−1
j ), and (x
−1
i xj , y
−1
i yj) for the
solutions g1 = ai and g2 = bi respectively using an algorithm for the CSP. We
can get more conjugacy extractor functions by choosing different values for i and
j. The the verification (can be done efficiently using the algorithms for the word
problem when G is the braid group e.g. see [10]) ya =
? g1xag2, yb =
? g1xbg2
will be true by the above assumption for all (a, b) = (i, j), hence we have shown
the EDL to be true in this case.
If we know the generators of the subgroupsA and B then we may use a length
based algorithm to recover the secret element with non-negligible probability.
The EDL can be partially solved if it is true that the assumption ai = aj
and bi = bj for at least two integers i and j, i, j ∈ [1,m] and i 6= j. Then the
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proof that the EDL can be partially solved is the same as above except there
are fewer choices for i and j.
7. Second Algorithm using CE Functions
Given (the DP equation) u = xaz. This attack reveals partial information
about the secret z or totally recover z. This attack is a generalisation of our
attack on the DP by using a MSCSP.
1. The attacker picks elements SI according to some criteria relating to
commutativity, for example elements SI may be picked randomly or SI may be
composed of a few Artin generators as these may commute to some degree with
z.
2. Then for 1 ≤ I ≤M for a sequence of integers TI
CEI(SI , u) = uSIu
−1 = xazSIz
−1a−1x−1 = xazSIz
−1a−1x−1
where (with probability ρ) z is a partial factor of z for some I this means
z = zTIzTI .
3. We solve for each I the CSP (SI , CEI(SI , u)) for the solution xaz) and
hence compute zTI = ((xaz
−1)−1xaz)−1. Note if SI is selected from the cen-
traliser of z then we can use the MSCSP at this step (so this shows DP is Turing
reducible to MSCSP).
4. We now find (in some way) z using the information (SI , xaz, zTI ) and the
other information used in the protocol. One of the simplest choices to implement
this step is trying to find z for each I by brute force and hence possibly recover
z.
A variant of the above attack is after zTI is recovered is to repeat at the
attack (at least once) by iterating with uz−1TI instead of u (and obviously all
other values may be different) so in this way we may be able to find a bigger
factor of z. It may be true (with some probability ρ2) that z contains a partial
factor of a which means the CSP is solved to give zTIaTI where aTI is some
partial factor of a. Then the simplest choice at this step to recover z is to find
aTI by brute force and use aTI to recover z.
Conclusion
We have shown the protocols [10],[2],[6],[7],[11],[13],[14] can have security
based on the MSCSP. We have shown the DP and DH-DP can be solved by
the MSCSP. Our theorem 1 implies that the CKLHC cryptosystem and related
cryptosystems are MSCSP based so are no more secure than using the AAG
protocol [1]. Our theorem 1 implies that semigroups should (for G) be used for
the protocol in [12] to be secure so not based on the MSCSP. We should not
use the CKLHC protocol in [10] or related protocols (which are suggested to
be used in braid groups) compared to using the AAG protocol as it is no more
secure than using the AAG in the connection they are based on the MSCSP.
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